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Horizontal Uniformity and Vertical
Chaos: State Choice of Law Clauses
and Preemption Under the Federal
Arbitration Act
Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. TIG Insurance Co.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the goal of arbitration is speedy and efficient resolution of disputes,
these goals may be frustrated by judicial interpretation of choice of law provisions
in commercial agreements.2 There is uncertainty as to the law that a court will
apply in deciding a motion to stay or otherwise interfere with an arbitration.3
There is further uncertainty surrounding whether the law governing arbitration is
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the arbitration law of the state where the arbi-
tration is taking place, or that of the state mentioned in a choice of law clause.4
The federal courts have adopted conflicting standards so that similarly situated
litigants are treated differently, solely based on where the initial suit was filed.5
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue in two seminal cases,
Volt Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univer-
sity,6 and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton.7 The federal circuits have
construed the mandates of Volt and Mastrobuono differently. 8 This Note explores
the impact that choice of law clauses in commercial agreements have on the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration as construed by the federal courts.
1. 360 F.3d 322 (2d Cir. 2004).
2. Id. at 323.
3. Id.
4. Id. See generally Zhaodong Jiang, Note, Federal Arbitration Right, Choice of Law Clauses and
State Rules and Procedure, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 159, 168-189 (1992).
5. See Action Indus., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2004);
Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 136 F.3d 380, 382-83 (4th Cir. 1998); Ferro Corp. v. Garri-
son Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 937-38 (6th Cir. 1998); PaineWebber, Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 594
(1st Cir. 1996).
6. 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (holding that the FAA did not preempt California procedural rules because
the California Court of Appeals made an unreviewable factual determination that the parties had
agreed to it).
7. 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (holding that enforcement of a state rule in a choice of law clause must be
harmonized through the application of substantive federal policy favoring arbitration).
8. See UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
choice of law clause should not be interpreted as displacing the FAA absent a clear expression of such
intent); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that there
was no inherent conflict between the parties' decision to submit all issues to arbitration and their adop-
tion of a choice of law clause that permitted courts to preempt the decisions of arbitrators).
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II. FACTS & HOLDING
In 1998, TIG Insurance Company (TIG) entered into an agreement (Reinsur-
ance Agreement) with Security Insurance Company of Hartford (Security), under
which Security agreed to indemnify TIG for a portion of TIG's liability arising out
of certain worker's compensation insurance policies. 9 The Reinsurance Agree-
ment contained an arbitration clause' ° and a choice of law clause, which desig-
nated California state law as governing the agreement." Security subsequently
entered into another contract (Retrocession Agreement) with Trustmark Insurance
Company (Trustmark) "whereby Trustmark agreed to reinsure Security for 100%
of the risk that Security had assumed from TIG under the Reinsurance Agree-
ment."' 12  The Retrocession Agreement did not contain an arbitration clause.
13
Both contracts were negotiated by WEB Management (WEB), who acted as Secu-
rity's agent in both deals.
14
In November 2001, "Trustmark informed Security that [it believed] TIG had
defrauded WEB in connection with the Reinsurance Agreement," thereby defraud-
ing Trustmark under the terms of the Retrocession Agreement.'- Trustmark sug-
gested that Security rescind the Reinsurance Agreement, but failed to offer Secu-
rity any proof of TIG's alleged fraud. 16 On November 26, 2001, Trustmark in-
formed Security that it was rescinding their Retrocession Agreement.17
Security subsequently filed a complaint against Trustmark in federal district
court in Connecticut, seeking a declaration that Trustmark was not entitled to
rescind and that Trustmark remained liable for all losses covered by the agree-
ment. 18 Trustmark, in turn, filed a third party complaint against TIG on May 3,
2002, alleging that TIG had defrauded WEB during the Reinsurance Agreement
negotiations, and fraudulently induced the Retrocession Agreement between
Trustmark and Security.19 After Security suspended further payments to TIG
9. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 2004).
10. Id. The arbitration clause stated: "As a condition precedent to any right of action hereunder, any
irreconcilable dispute between parties to this Agreement shall be submitted for decision to a board of
arbitration composed of two arbitrators and an umpire meeting a place [sic] to be agreed by the board."
Id. at 303 n.1.
11. Id. The choice of law clause (referred to by the parties as the "governing clause") read as fol-
lows: "This Agreement shall be governed by and construed according to the laws of the state of Cali-
fornia, except as to rules regarding credit for reinsurance in which case the rules of all applicable states
shall pertain thereto. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event of a conflict between any provision
of this Agreement and the laws of the domiciliary state of any company intended to be reinsured here-
under, the domiciliary state's laws shall prevail." Id. at 323 n.2 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 324. The coverage periods for the Reinsurance agreement and the Retrocession Agree-
ment covered the same twenty four month period beginning January 1, 1999. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *2 (D. Conn. 2002).
13. Trustmark Ins. Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27348, at *2.
14. Id. WEB "is an underwriting agency that serves as a Managing General Underwriter" (MGU) to
other insurers. Id. at *1. An MGU underwrites, administers, and manages a portfolio on behalf of a
principal. Id. at *2. In early 1997, WEB became MGU for Trustmark; WEB also became MGU for
Security on December 1, 1998. Id.




19. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 602, 604 (D. Conn. 2003).
Trustmark further alleged that the Reinsurance Agreement constituted an attempt by TIG to transfer
[Vol. I
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Choice of Law Clauses
based on Trustmark's allegations of fraud, TIG invoked the arbitration clause in
the Reinsurance Agreement.
20
Security proposed that Trustmark undertake the defense of TIG's claims
against Security and suggested resolving all pending issues in arbitration. 21 Secu-
rity and Trustmark failed to reach an agreement and the arbitration between Secu-
rity and TIG continued. 22 TIG and Security selected arbitrators and umpires, and
submitted positional statements to the arbitration panel.23 The arbitral panel
adopted a briefing and hearing schedule that provided for an evidentiary hearing
in New York to begin on August 11, 2003.24 Prior to the evidentiary hearing,
Security requested the arbitration proceedings cease, pending the federal litiga-
tion.2 5 The panel denied Security's motion.26
Security also requested that the district court stop the arbitration until the liti-
gation had been completed.2 7 Security argued that while the Reinsurance Agree-
ment fell under the scope of the FAA, by including the California choice of law
provision, Security and TIG evinced their intent to have California procedural and
substantive law govern their dispute.28 Security argued that a stay was warranted
because the Reinsurance Agreement's choice of law provision incorporated Cali-
fornia's Civil Procedure Code as well as California's substantive law.29 Section
1281.2(c)(4) authorizes the stay of arbitration where one of the parties is also a
party to a pending lawsuit arising out of the same transaction because there is a
possibility of conflicting rulings. TIG opposed the motion on the basis that a
tens of millions in losses from its failing worker's compensation business to its reinsurers, Security and
Trustmark. Id.
20. Id.









30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 2004). The code provides:
On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to
arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court
shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:
(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special pro-
ceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and
there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. For purposes of this
section, a pending court action or special proceeding includes an action or proceeding initiated by
the party refusing to arbitrate after the petition to compel arbitration has been filed, but on or be-
fore the date of the hearing on the petition
If the court determines that a party to the arbitration is also a party to litigation in a pending court
action or special proceeding with a third party as set forth under subdivision (c) herein, the court
(1) may refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement and may order intervention or joinder of all
parties in a single action or special proceeding; (2) may order intervention or joinder as to all or
only certain issues; (3) may order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration
and stay the pending court action or special proceeding pending the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding; or (4) may stay arbitration pending the court action or special proceeding.
2005]
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general choice of law provision was insufficient as a matter of law to incorporate
state procedural rules and that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mas-
trobouno compelled a different result.
3
'
The district court granted Security's motion and issued an order preventing
32the arbitration from proceeding. The court determined that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Volt resolved the issue of whether the California
statute was preempted by the FAA.3 3 The court reasoned that because the inter-
pretation of contracts is usually an issue of state law, and state law provides the
tools by which the intent of the parties was ascertained, the case is controlled by
California contract interpretation principles.34
The district court also rejected TIG's contention that the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Mastrobuono required a different result, highlighting that Mastrobuono
turned on the application of New York law, not California law, and that the New
York procedural rule was hostile to arbitration.35 The court noted that in Volt,
California's section 1281.2, did not, as a matter of law, undermine the goals and
policies of the FAA, but instead fostered the federal policy favoring arbitration.36
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision and held that the FAA
did not preempt the California rule. The court concluded that the choice of law
clause providing that the parties' agreement would be "governed by" California
law incorporating California procedural rules of arbitration, and that Security's
participation in preliminary arbitration proceedings did not waive its right to seek
a stay in arbitration proceedings.37
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Before Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),38 courts treated
contractual provisions to arbitrate disputes with hostility. 39 The FAA curtailed
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements within contracts involving commerce,
declaring those agreements valid and enforceable. 40  Section 2 of the FAA de-
scribes the proper scope and application of the FAA's provisions and explicitly
requires that courts enforce arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate
commerce.4 1 Section 4 of the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agree-
ments in the manner provided by the parties' agreement.
42
Id.
31. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 325 (2nd Cir. 2004).
32. Id.
33. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Trustmark Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605 (citing Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 610 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 470-72).
37. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d at 328-29.
38. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2004)).
39. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991). The FAA's "purpose was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common
law and had been adopted by the American courts . I. " Id.
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
41. Id. See also Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
(holding that the FAA creates "a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any
[Vol. I
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After the passage of the FAA, states enacted their own arbitration statutes
recognizing the validity of arbitration agreements. 43 However, many of those state
statutes contain restrictions on arbitration that are not present in the FAA.4 Some
of those restrictions are substantive, and exclude certain types of disputes from
arbitration,45 while others are procedural and require that certain conditions be met
for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable.4 The California statute at issue in
TIG Insurance is like those of some jurisdictions which permit a permanent or
temporary stay of arbitration if related disputes involving parties not subject to the
arbitration agreement are being litigated.4
In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court addressed the extent to
which the FAA preempts restrictive state arbitration laws in the absence of a
choice of law clause.48 Those cases held that "state as well as federal courts are
bound by the provisions of the FAA concerning the [validity and] enforceability
of arbitration agreements ... involv[ing] commerce., 49 Further, those cases ar-
ticulate Congressional intent that the FAA applies to all contracts within its power
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act"); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (the FAA is a body of substantive law promulgated under the Com-
merce Clause that governs arbitration clauses in transactions involving interstate commerce).
42. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004). The FAA requires that questions of arbitrability be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration and that any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H., 460 U.S.at 24-25. See also Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (stating "[there is
no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is sim-
ply to ensure the enforceability according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate"); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (stating that the FAA is a substantive statute promulgated under
the Commerce Clause, and establishes the supremacy of the FAA over arbitration agreements);
PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1198 (2d Cir. 1996) (articulating the principle that "arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which
has not so agreed to submit").
43. Thomas A. Diamond, Choice of Law Clauses and Their Preemptive Effect on the Federal Arbi-
tration Act: Recognizing the Supreme Court with Itself, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 35, 37 (1997); Jessica
Thrope, Comment, A Question of Intent: Choice of Law, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 16 (1999).
44. Diamond, supra note 43, at 38. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.350 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401 (1995).
45. Diamond, supra note 43, at 37-38. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-57-2-22 (Michie 1999);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-114(2)(b) (1995) (excluding arbitration in transactions for goods or services
in which the consideration was $5000 or less); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 399-c.2 (McKinney 1996).
46. Diamond, supra note 43, at 38. See e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982) (mandating
arbitration agreements concerning health care claims be in bold print and state that the parties are
waiving their right to a jury trial); Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (2004) (requiring arbitration clause be in
ten point capital letters above or adjacent to the signature line on the first page of a contract).
47. Diamond, supra note 43, at 38 (explaining that some jurisdictions permit a stay of arbitration
where related disputes outside the scope of arbitration agreement are being litigated). See e.g. CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(c) (West 1982); IND. CODE § 34-57-2-3 (1986).
48. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
49. Thomas A. Diamond, supra note 43, at 39. See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Reception of
Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1988) (noting the Supreme Court's
uncompromising stand on the preemptive effect of the FAA on conflicting state arbitration laws);
Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization ofArbitration Law, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1305, 1309 (1985); Janet L. Herold, Federal Preemption-Arbitration-Federal Arbitration Act
Creates National Substantive Law Applicable in Federal and State Courts and Supercedes Contrary
State Statutes, 54 MIss. L.J. 571 (1984).
2005]
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to regulate.5 0 Thus, no state law may "impose restrictions upon the enforceability
of arbitration agreements [involving commerce] that exceed those provided [in]
the FAA.' When interpreting an arbitration clause, courts are instructed to re-
solve all doubts in favor of arbitration. 2 Consequently, when state laws seek to
"limit the enforceability of arbitration agreements contained in contracts, [those]
involving commerce are [typically] preempted by. .. the FAA. ' 3
Unfortunately the Supreme Court has not clearly explained when a state's re-
strictive arbitration statutes may be applicable through a choice of law clause. 4
While the Supreme Court has held that parties have the power to contract around
the provisions of the FAA, it has not articulated a cogent standard for determining
when the parties have so agreed. 5 When forced to analyze a generic choice of
law clause's meaning, the lower courts "have struggled to determine whether
these clauses were intended to supply only the general substantive law of the se-
lected forum, or instead to supply both that forum's substantive law and its arbi-
tration rules. 5 6 The effect of a choice of law clause will depend on whether a
court interpreting the agreement must apply the designated state's rules of con-
struction or whether the underlying policies of the FAA require a rule of construc-
tion that preempts state law. 7
TIG Insurance presents the issue of what impact a choice of law provision in
a contract with an arbitration clause has on whether the pro-arbitration rules and
policies embedded in the FAA will be applied.58 Preemption issues like the one in
50. Diamond, supra note 43, at 39 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 277
(1995)).
51. Diamond, supra note 43, at 39.
52. Moses H., 460 U.S. at 24-25; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16; Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9; Al-
lied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686. "Courts may not... invalidate arbitra-
tion agreements under state law applicable only to arbitration provisions .... By enacting § 2 [of the
FAA], we have several times said, Congress precluded states from singling out arbitration provisions
for suspect status ..... Id.
53. Diamond, supra note 43, at 40.
54. Note, An Unnecessary Choice of Law: Volt, Mastrobuono, and Federal Arbitration Act Preemp-
tion, 115 HARv. L. REv. 2250, 2251 (2002) [hereinafter Unnecessary Choice of Law].
55. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Diamond, supra note
43, at 61. Diamond explains three possible interpretations of a choice of law clause:
First, the clause may be interpreted as a conflict of laws resolver, designating which among the
fifty states' laws should govern, and leaving undisturbed the applicable federal law. Second, it
may be interpreted as an agreement to apply the designated state's substantive law, unencum-
bered by otherwise applicable federal law, but not encompassing the state's allocation of powers
between courts and arbitrators, allowing the preemptive effect of the FAA to remain intact.
Third, it may be interpreted as an agreement to apply the designated state's laws, including its
arbitration laws, over all other state and federal laws, thereby excluding the FAA.
Id. at 40-41.
56. Unnecessary Choice of Law, supra note 54, at 2250-51. See generally Roadway Package Sys.,
Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3rd Cir. 2001) (explaining that such clauses are problematic as well
as ubiquitous in commercial agreements).
57. See generally Jiang, supra note 4. If the policies underlying the FAA mandate a rule of con-
struction that preempts state law, courts also must determine what that rule should be and when such a
rule should be imposed.
58. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 2004). By adopting a
California choice of law clause, the parties had consensually displaced the requirements of the FAA,
that an arbitration proceed, even if the result is that arbitration is stayed where the FAA would other-
wise permit it to go forward. Id. (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470 (1989)). But see Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223
[Vol. I
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TIG Insurance arise where the parties include a state choice of law provision in
their agreement, but disagree as to whether such a provision includes the state's
arbitration rules as well as rules of decision. 59 There is inconsistency among the
federal appellate courts on this issue in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions
in Volt60 and Mastrobuono.6' Indeed, the state and federal courts have struggled,
if not failed to establish clear rules about the effect of choice of law clauses on the
proper application of the FAA. 62 This split in authority on the choice of law ap-
plicable to allocate authority between courts and arbitrators frustrates the efforts
of commercial practitioners seeking to ensure that disputes are arbitrated and that
arbitration will be governed by the FAA and not the restrictive state arbitration
law.63
In Volt, the parties contracted for the construction of electrical conduits on
California's Stanford University campus. 64 The contract contained an arbitration
clause and a provision that provided in pertinent part that "the contract shall be
governed by the law of the place where the project is located. 65 After a dispute
arose over whether Volt was entitled to compensation for extra work on the pro-
ject, Volt demanded that the dispute be submitted to arbitration. 66 Stanford subse-
quently filed a civil suit in California state court alleging fraud and breach of con-
tract. 67 The court denied Volt's petition to compel arbitration and instead stayed
arbitration pending the outcome of Stanford's litigation with Volt and two other
defendants joined by Stanford who did not have arbitration agreements. 68 The
California appellate court affirmed, holding that while the FAA governed the arbi-
tration agreement, and did not permit a stay, the parties had agreed to apply Cali-
fornia's arbitration law and that honoring the agreement was consistent with the
FAA.
69
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California appellate court, not-
ing that "the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law,
which this court does not sit to review." 70 While the FAA requires that any doubts
as to whether a dispute is arbitrable are to be "addressed with a healthy regard for
... arbitration,"7' and that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues..
be resolved in favor of arbitration, ' 72 the Supreme Court held that these princi-
(1985) (holding that the FAA is applicable, with few exceptions, to all arbitrations in interstate com-
merce, and that an arbitration must be allowed to proceed, even if the arbitration may yield decisions
that could have inconvenient res judicata effects in other litigation).
59. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 2004). Both parties agreed
that the Reinsurance Agreement fell under the scope of the FAA, but disagreed as to whether including
the California choice of law provision evidenced their intent to employ California arbitration rules. Id.
60. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,470 (1989).
61. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
62. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d at 323 (stating that "[t]his case presents a recurring and troubling theme").
63. See Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. Volt, 489 U.S. at 470.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 470-71.
68. Id. at 471.
69. Id. at 471-72.
70. Id. at 474.
71. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
72. Id. at 24-25.
20051
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ples were not offended by interpreting a choice of law clause to exclude applica-
tion of the FAA.73
In Volt, the California appellate court had held as a matter of fact that the par-
ties had agreed to apply California arbitration rules to their arbitration. 74 On re-
view, the Supreme Court accepted this finding, holding that the FAA applied to
the arbitration since it involved interstate commerce, but required that it be carried
out as the parties agreed, under California rules, allowing a California judge to
stay the arbitration.75
In Mastrobuono, investors opened a brokerage account with Shearson Leh-
man Hutton. 76 Their contract contained an arbitration clause providing for arbitra-
tion in accordance with arbitration code of the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).77 The investors subsequently sued in federal district court
against Shearson alleging mishandling of their account and violations of state and
federal law.78 Shearson moved to stay proceedings and compel arbitration; the
motion was granted and the dispute was arbitrated. 79 The arbitral panel ruled in
favor of the Mastrobuonos and awarded both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.80 Shearson paid the compensatory damages, but filed a motion in federal
district court to vacate the punitive damages award on the basis that that the con-
tract's choice of law clause required the application of New York arbitration law
which prohibits the award of punitive damages by an arbitrator. 8' The district
court agreed and vacated the punitive damages award.82 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed.83
The United States Supreme Court granted the Mastrobuono's petition for writ
of certiorari, reversed the lower court decisions and reinstated the punitive damage
award. 84 The Court held that while the parties had the right to contract around the
provisions of the FAA, 5 they had not actually done so in this case.86 Rather, the
choice of law clause was ambiguous and could be interpreted in one of three
ways. 7 Of the three possible interpretations, the Court determined that only an
intent to apply New York's laws, including its arbitration laws over all other laws
both state and federal, would reflect an intent to bypass the provisions of the
88FAA. Because the choice of law clause was ambiguous, it should have been
73. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)
(speaking of the "Moses H. Cone principle").
74. Id. at 468. See also Jiang, supra note 4, at 159 (noting the United States Supreme Court's re-
fusal to review the California court's interpretation of the choice of law clause).
75. Id.





81. Id. at 54-55.
82. Id. at 54.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 55.
85. Id. at 57.
86. Id. at 61.
87. See generally id. at 58-64.
88. See id. at 63.
[Vol. I
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Choice of Law Clauses
construed to incorporate the FAA; the FAA does not prevent arbitrators from
awarding punitive damages.
89
The Supreme Court justified its holding on the basis that while a choice of
law clause introduces ambiguity into an arbitration agreement, when a court inter-
prets such provisions in an agreement covered by the FAA, the court must give
due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration. 90 Further, ambiguities as to
the scope of the arbitration clause itself must be resolved in favor of arbitration. 91
The Court also took a bifurcated approach to interpreting the contract by deter-
mining that the choice of law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties
and the arbitration clause covers arbitration.92 Unlike Volt, Mastrobuono articu-
lated limits on a court's ability to construe a choice of law clause to restrict the
application of the FAA.93
Lower courts have interpreted the mandates of Volt and Mastrobuono differ-
ently, and have suggested different solutions to this conflict. The minority posi-
tion articulated by the Second Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit is that
broad choice of law provisions are sufficient as a matter of law to opt out of the
FAA's default rules and invoke state arbitration laws.94
The majority position, followed by eight of the federal circuits, holds that the
inclusion of a general choice of law provision in a contract containing an agree-
ment to arbitrate will not oust application of the FAA in favor of state law arbitra-
tion standards.95 Rather, they establish a "strong default presumption" that the
FAA, not state law, supplies the rules for arbitration.96 The leading case on the
majority position is Roadway Package System v. Kayser, in which the Third Cir-
cuit interpreted a choice of law clause that provided that the contract "shall be
governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania." 97 The court concluded that the issue of "contract construction" of
an arbitration agreement to which the FAA applied is not governed by state law,
but is governed by federal law, and that a general choice of law clause, standing
89. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 64 (stating that "[tlhe choice of law provision covers the rights and duties of the parties,
while the arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither sentence intrudes upon the other"). See also
Thrope, supra note 43, at 82.
93. The Mastrobuono court attempted to reconcile its holding in Volt with that of Mastrobuono in a
footnote, which provides:
In Volt . . . we did not interpret the contract de novo. Instead, we deferred to the California
court's construction of its own State's law .... In the present case, by contrast, we review a fed-
eral court's interpretation of this contract, and our interpretation accords with that of the only de-
cision-maker arguably entitled to deference-the arbitrator.
Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n.4. Few commentators have found this attempt at reconciliation persua-
sive. See generally Thrope, supra note 43, at 81-85.
94. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004); Ekstrom v. Value
Health, Inc., 68 F.3d 1391, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
95. See Action Indus., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cit. 2004);
Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2002); Roadway Package System, Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 2001); Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 136 F.3d 380,
382 (4th Cit. 1998); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 937 (6th Cir. 1998); UHC
Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87
F.3d 589, 594 (1st Cir. 1996); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Sovak, 280 F.3d at 1269.
97. Roadway, 257 F.3d at 290.
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alone, is insufficient to support a finding that contracting parties intended to opt
out of the FAA's default standards.98
The Sixth Circuit promulgated a similar analysis, holding that the parties' in-
clusion of an Ohio choice of law clause did not preclude the application of the
FAA. 99 Rather, the choice of law provision gave "no indication that the parties
intended to incorporate Ohio law" to govern the scope of their agreement to arbi-
trate. 1°° The court underscored the importance of its holding that a general choice
of law provision does not displace the FAA. 01 The court noted that "[m]ost con-
tracts include a choice of law clause, and thus, if each of these clauses were read
to foreclose the application of the substantive law enacted by Congress in the
FAA, the FAA would be applicable in very few cases."1 0 2 Indeed, "such an inter-
pretation of the FAA would effectively emaciate the Act itself."'
0 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. TIG Insurance Co., the Second Cir-
cuit went against the majority rule and held that the parties' adoption of a Califor-
nia choice of law clause to govern their commercial agreement subjected a New
York-based arbitration to a rule of the California Civil Procedure Code.t04 The
California rule authorizes a court to stay an arbitration while the court undertakes
to make its own decision of issues of fact and law that are common to the arbitra-
tion and the lawsuit involving not only the parties to the arbitration, but also a
third party who has not agreed to arbitrate. l05 By adopting a California choice of
law clause, the court held that the parties had consensually displaced the preemp-
tive requirements of the FAA.I° 6
The Second Circuit treated the issue as one of contract interpretation, and fo-
cused its analysis on whether the choice of law provision at issue was a "general"
one, and whether the language of the choice of law clause indicated the parties'
intent for California substantive and procedural law to govern. 107 After applying
California contract law, the court determined that the parties had as a matter of
law contracted around the FAA's default standard. 0 8 Relying heavily on Volt, the
98. Id. at 300.
99. See Ferro Corp., 142 F.3d at 933.
100. Id. at 937.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 938.
103. Id.
104. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 328-329 (2d Cir. 2004).
105. Id. at 324.
106. Id. at 328.
107. Id.
108. Id. (emphais added). This is an important distinction, since the Supreme Court in Volt gave
deference to the California Court of Appeals findings of fact as to whether the parties intended to
include state arbitration rules via the contractual choice of law provision. Id. at 327-328. See also
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). The court in
TIG Insurance held that as a matter of California law, a choice of law provision providing that Califor-
nia law will govern a commercial agreement is sufficient to evade the FAA's substantive and proce-
dural requirements. 360 F.3d at 328.
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court further articulated that their construction did not negate the strong federal
policy favoring arbitration. 109
The Second Circuit distinguished TIG Insurance from Mastrobuono on the
basis that the latter case construed New York law not California law, and that the
statute in Mastrobuono imposed substantive restrictions on the authority of the
arbitrator, while the California statute in the instant case, does not impose the
same restrictions. 0 The court further stated that its opinion did not upset the
balance of authority between the courts and the arbitrator, but merely changed the
order of proceedings."'
Both the Second Circuit and the district court looked to the California appel-
late court decision in Mt. Diablo Medical Center v. Health Net of California,112 to
determine how California law would treat the choice of law provision in the par-
ties' contract.' 13 In Mt. Diablo, the disputed contract included a broad choice of
law clause which stated that "[t]he validity, construction, interpretation and en-
forcement of this Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the state of Califor-
nia."' 1 4 The court held that while the choice of law clause was generic and did not
mention arbitration, it was still "broad, unqualified and all-encompassing.'"
5
Thus, the choice of law provision was construed to incorporate California's pro-
cedural rules regarding arbitration." 6 Under Mt. Diablo, a "broad" California
choice of law clause incorporates California arbitration rules. 17 However, the
forum for the arbitration in Mt. Diablo was California, and the choice of law
clause in Mt. Diablo notably included the term "enforcement."'" 8 The agreement
in TIG Insurance by its own terms applied only to "validity, construction, and
interpretation."" 19
The court in Mt. Diablo emphasized that "enforcement" could refer to en-
forcement through arbitration and cited a New York case for that proposition: the
New York case applied New York statutory restrictions on arbitration on the
ground that the parties had agreed that the contract and its "enforcement" should
be governed by New York law, as arbitration was a type of "enforcement."' 20 The
court in TIG Insurance noted that there was no reference to "enforcement" in the
choice of law clause before it, but discounted this point.
2 1
The court's construction of California law in TIG Insurance also relied heav-
ily on a recent California Supreme Court decision, Nedlloyd Lines B. V. v. Superior
109. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 327.
111. Id.
112. 101 Cal. App. 4th 711 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
113. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d at 327.
114. Id. at 328 (quoting Mt. Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th 711, 716
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).




119. Id. (comparing the TIG Insurance agreement to the Mt. Diablo agreement and calling the TIG
Insurance choice of law clause "similarly broad and all encompassing").
120. Mt. Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th 711, 724 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Smith Barney v. Luckie, 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1997)).
121. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 329 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004).
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122 12Court, which broadly construed a Hong Kong choice of law clause. 23 In Nedl-
loyd, the court held that by adopting Hong Kong law to govern a commercial
agreement (that did not call for arbitration), the parties had adopted Hong Kong
law to govern non-contractual aspects of their relationship.1 24 Since the court in
Nedlloyd gave a broad interpretation to a choice of Hong Kong law in a contract
governed by that law, the Second Circuit concluded it would give a broad inter-
pretation to a choice of California law. 125 However, the Nedlloyd court did not
indicate that it would have adopted Hong Kong rules of civil procedure in place of
the California rules of procedure.1
26
V. COMMENT
In TIG Insurance, the Second Circuit was faced with a chance to apply the
mandates of Volt and Mastrobuono to the question of whether adopting a Califor-
nia choice of law clause governing the "validity, construction, and interpreta-
tion"1 27 of a commercial agreement also included an implicit agreement to dis-
place the FAA's requirement that an arbitration must be allowed to proceed re-
gardless of whether the arbitration may create decisions that could have an incon-
venient res judicata impact on other litigation. 128 While answering that question in
the affirmative, 29 the court highlighted its departure from the majority position
that a general choice of law clause should not be interpreted as displacing the
FAA absent a clear showing of intent to do so. 30 Mastrobuono and the decisions
of other federal appellate courts hold that issues of contract interpretation should
be made with deference to the arbitral panel.131 TIG Insurance appears to be in
conflict with those courts.
122. 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992).
123. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 328 (2d Cir. 2004).
124. Id.
125. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Super. Ct., 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992) (explaining that California abides
by the general proposition that sophisticated commercial parties intend a general choice of law clause
to control the entire agreement).
126. Id.
127. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d at 323.
128. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
129. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d at 322.
130. See generally Action Indus., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337 (5th Cir.
2004); Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 2002); Roadway Package Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287 (3d Cir. 2001); Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926
(6th Cir. 1998); Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 136 F.3d 380, 382-83 (4th Cir. 1998) (es-
tablishing a presumption that the parties intended the FAA to govern the agreement absent a clear
expression of the parties to invoke state arbitration law and "squarely rejecting the argument that a
federal court should read a contract's general choice of law provision as invoking state arbitration
law"); UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
court would not "interpret an arbitration agreement as precluding the application of the FAA unless the
parties' intent that the agreement be so construed is abundantly clear"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 1996); PaineWebber Inc. v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589 (1st Cir.
1996); Kelley v. Michaels, 59 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 1995).
131. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 60 n.4 (1995) (distinguishing Volt
and holding that the only decision maker arguably entitled to deference is the arbitrator); Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (holding that issues that arise out of an arbitration,
like contract interpretation, presumptively should be resolved by the arbitrator); Pacificare Health Sys.,
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TIG Insurance also raises questions about the "strong federal policy in favor
of arbitration" and the allocation of power between courts and arbitrators in most
commercial agreements. Most commercial agreements contain both arbitration
and choice of law provisions, and the practical result of staying arbitration pend-
ing litigation is to shift the balance of authority over the dispute from the arbitrator
to the courts. 32  The ruling in TIG Insurance seriously curtails the arbitrator's
authority and undermines the arbitrator's presumptive responsibility for resolving
issues of contract interpretation and procedural questions arising out of arbitra-
tion.1
33
United States Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Second Circuit over-
reached in TIG Insurance.13 4 Under the Supreme Court's holding in Howsam, the
Second Circuit was bound to either allow the arbitral panel to decide whether the
parties had intended to incorporate state arbitration rules into their agreement, or
at a minimum, afford appropriate deference to the arbitral panel's refusal to grant
a stay pending litigation. 135 The Second Circuit's holding also conflicts with the
other federal circuits on the question of whether arbitrators or courts should re-
solve the issue of contract interpretation relating to the conduct of the arbitra-
tion. 136 Under res judicata principles, the arbitrator will be bound by a court's
legal and factual findings, and subsequent arbitration will be a pointless formal-
ity.1 37 The Second Circuit's analysis is inconsistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent and effectively deprives the parties of their right to arbitrate instead of liti-
gate.
The ruling by the Second Circuit in TIG Insurance, that California's section
1281.2 does not restrict an arbitrator's power, is clearly wrong. The arbitration
clause at issue in TIG Insurance addresses the default order of proceedings before
the arbitral panel. 38 At a minimum, the court's decision withdraws from the arbi-
trators any ability to control the timing of the arbitral hearing or the panel's ulti-
mate decision. Rather, "belated enforcement of the arbitration clause ... signifi-
Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003) (holding that procedural questions that arise out of the dispute
and bear on its final disposition are presumptively not for the judge, but for the arbitrator to decide).
132. Compare Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 327 (2nd Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that although a stay would prevent the arbitral panel from issuing any decision, the court's interfer-
ence with the arbitral process "does not limit... the arbitrator's power to resolve the dispute"), with
Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that section 1281.2 (c)
"assuredly does effect California's allocation of power between alternative tribunals").
133. See Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 n.4.
134. See Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (applying John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557
(1964) and explaining that "'procedural questions which grow out of [a] dispute and bear on its final
disposition' are presumptively not for the judge, but for an arbitrator, to decide"); Vimar Seguros y
Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (holding that the First Circuit rightly
"reserve[d] judgment on the choice of law question, as it must be decided in the first instance by the
arbitrator"); Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 583 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003) (holding that a court
should not "take upon [itself] the authority to decide the antecedent question of how [an ambiguous
contract term] is to be resolved").
135. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85.
136. See Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying
Howsam and other principles to conclude that "the extent of an arbitrator's procedural and remedial
authority are issues for the arbitrator to resolve in the first instance"); Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare
Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that arbitrators
should decide questions of contract construction).
137. Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
138. See Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. TIG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 327 (2nd Cir. 2004).
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cantly disappoints the expectations of the parties and frustrates the clear purpose
of their agreement."'
39
This decision also goes against the "substantive rights" guaranteed by the
FAA, and its application to commercial agreements to arbitrate. 14 In rejecting the
majority approach, the Second Circuit adopted a rule that restricts the scope of the
FAA, fails to give effect to the FAA's policy favoring arbitration, and creates a
complex legal framework that undermines Congressional intent to promote arbi-
tration as a quick and efficient means of dispute resolution.1
41
The Second Circuit defended its holding in TIG Insurance in part by distin-
guishing between "substantive" and "procedural" state law arbitration provi-
sions. 142 The court claimed that because section 1281.2(c) was "procedural" in
nature, it did not offend the substantive law of the FAA.143 However, as explained
by the Third Circuit, distinguishing between "procedural" and "substantive" pro-
visions "would unduly complicate the law in this area."'
44
Indeed, if a party "complained about multiple issues, at least one of which
was 'procedural' and at least one of which [was] 'substantive,"' separate determi-
nations would have to be made, balancing "multiple legal regimes within the same
case."'14 5 Introduction of this additional level of complexity in this context should
be rejected, as it is unlikely to reflect the actual intent of the parties. 46 Rather, it
is "most unlikely that any sizeable number of parties would wish to be bound by
some federal standards and some state ones. This added complexity under-
mines one of the principle benefits of arbitration-its status as a less expensive
alternative to litigation. 1
48
Under the minority view articulated in TIG Insurance, choice of law provi-
sions will be read to reinstate the type of state arbitration standards that the FAA
was enacted to displace. 149 Based on the rationale of the Second Circuit, the FAA
would apply only when the parties to contracts containing general choice of law
provisions affirmatively excluded application of state arbitration rules and ex-
pressly stated their intention to be bound by the FAA. 150 Such a holding runs
contrary to the Supreme Court's earlier conclusion that Congress intended the
FAA to apply broadly to the full extent of its power under the Commerce Clause
even when there is no showing that the parties contemplated that the FAA would
govern their agreement to arbitrate.15 '
Under Mastrobuono, "regard must be given to the federal policy favoring ar-
bitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself [must be]
139. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. 11G Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 327 (2nd Cir. 2004).
143. Id. at 328-29.




148. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995).
149. Id.
150. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. 'HG Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 322, 328 (2nd Cir. 2004) (holding that "if
the parties intended for only California substantive law to govern, they could have easily made their
intentions clearer with a second exclusion for California's arbitration rules").
15 1. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 274-75.
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resolved in favor of arbitration."' 5 2 The notion that the federal policy favoring
arbitration should not inform the determination whether the parties rejected the
FAA in favor of state procedural rules reflects a misunderstanding of the FAA.
The "substantive provisions" of the FAA are designed to protect the arbitral
procedures chosen by the parties. Indeed, the purpose of the FAA was to allow
private parties to exchange the "procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 5 3 In this
sense, section 2 of the FAA is a "congressional declaration of liberal federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or pro-
cedural policies to the contrary."' 54 The notion that the federal policy favoring
arbitration should not inform the determination whether the parties rejected the
FAA in favor of state procedural rules is contrary to United States Supreme Court
precedent.
55
The majority approach establishes a default rule that choice of law provisions
do not displace the FAA in favor of state arbitration laws absent a clear expression
of the parties' intent to displace the FAA. 156 Indeed, these courts articulate a de-
fault rule which is designed to "minimize the frequency with which parties will be
found to have opted out of the FAA's default regime when they did not intent to
do so.' ' 157 This presumption also would make it "easy for arbitrators and district
courts to determine whether parties have opted out of federal standards."' 158 Fur-
ther, such a rule preserves "the ability of parties to contract around the default
federal standards." 1
59
Some commentators have attacked the majority position on the basis that dis-
places state contract law and raises federalism concerns. 160 Opponents of the ma-
jority position argue that establishing a presumption of FAA preemption in the
absence of a clear showing of intent to contract around the default FAA provisions
constitutes overreaching by the federal circuits and creates federalism issues; this
concern is overstated.' 6' Under Mastrobuono, and the majority's interpretation of
152. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 62 n.8 (1995) (quoting Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) and Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)).
153. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
154. See Moses H., 460 U.S.at 25. See also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985) (holding that the FAA "requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if...
the result is 'piecemeal' litigation").
155. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221.
156. See Action Indus., Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 342 (5th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001) and stating "a ge-
neric choice of law clause, standing alone, is insufficient to support a finding that contracting parties
intended to opt out of the FAA's default standards"); Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266,
1270 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a general choice of law provision provides the substantive, deci-
sional law but does not trump the presumption that the FAA supplies the rules for arbitration); Road-
way, 257 F.3d at 295-96; Porter Hayden Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 136 F.3d 380, 382-83 (4th Cir.
1998) (interpreting Mastrobuono as "squarely reject[ing] the argument that a federal court should read
a contract's general choice of law provision as invoking state law of arbitrability and displacing federal
arbitration law").
157. See Roadway, 257 F.3d at 296.
158. Id. at 296-97.
159. Id. at 297.
160. Unnecessary Choice of Law, supra note 54, at 2251.
161. Id. at 2262-63.
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that case, state law will continue to govern the interpretation of choice of law
clauses when the designated law affects arbitration procedure., 62 Federal law




The lower federal courts have failed to construe the mandates of Volt and
Mastrobuono in a cogent manner. As such, transactional practitioners will have to
consider the lack of uniformity among the federal courts on the effect a choice of
law provision has on a commercial agreement also containing an arbitration
clause. Practitioners will also need to keep in mind that, depending on the juris-
diction, they may need to specify that the FAA applies to arbitration, while the
choice of law specifies the rules of decision to be applied by the arbitrator or
panel.
JENNIFER TRIESHMANN
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